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It is a commonplace that the vast majority of the members of the
legal profession in English-speaking countries still regard "juris-
prudence" in all its manifestations, and especially that branch of it
commonly known as "analytical jurisprudence," as something aca-
demic and without practical value. It is believed that the chief reason,
or at least one of the reasons, for this view is not hard to discover.
Almost without exception the writers who have dealt with the subject
seem to have proceeded upon the theory that their task was finished
when they had set forth in orderly and logical array their own analysis
of the nature of law, of legal rights and duties, and similar things.
That the making of this analysis-aside from the mere intellectual
joy of it-is not an end in itself but merely a means to an end, these
writers perceive only dimly or not at all; that the analysis pre-
sented has any utility for the lawyer and the judge in solving the
problems which confront them, they do not as a rule attempt to
demonstrate; much less do they show that utility by practical
application of the analysis to the solution of concrete legal problems.
In the opinion of the present writer one of the greatest messages
which the late Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld during his all too short life
gave to the legal profession was this, that an adequate analytical
jurisprudence is an absolutely indispensable tool in the equipment of
the properly trained lawyer or judge-indispensable, that is, for the
highest efficiency in the discharge of the daily duties of his profes-
sion. It was Hohfeld's great merit that he saw that, interesting as
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analytical jurisprudence is when pursued for its own sake, its chief
value lies in the fact that by its aid the correct solution of legal
problems becomes not only easier but more certain. In this respect
it does not differ from any other branch of pure science. We must
hasten to add, lest we do an injustice to Hohfeld's memory by thus
emphasizing his work along the line of analytical jurisprudence, that
no one saw more clearly than he that while the analytical matter
is an indispensable tool, it is not an all-sufficient one for the lawyer.
On the contrary, he emphasized over and over again-especially in
his notable address before the Association of American Law Schools
upon A Vital School of Jurisprudence-that analytical work merely
paves the way for other branches of jurisprudence, and that without
the aid of the latter satisfactory solutions of legal problems cannot
be reached. Thus legal analysis to him was primarily a means to an
end, a necessary aid both in discovering just what the problems are
which confront courts and lawyers and in finding helpful analogies
which might otherwise be hidden. If attention is here directed chiefly
to Hohfeld's work in the analytical field, it is by reason of the fact
that the larger portion of his published writings is devoted to that
subject, in which he excelled because of his great analytical powers
and severely logical mind.
Hohfeld's writings consist entirely of articles in legal periodicals
and are scattered through the pages of several of these, as the following
list will show:
The Nature of Stockholders' Individual Liability for Corporation
Debts (19o9) 9 COLUmBIA LAW REVIEW, 285.
The Individual Liability of Stockholders and the Conflict of Laws
(1909) 9 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW, 492; (191o) IO ibid. 283;
io ibid. 520.
The Relations Between Equity and Law (1913) II MICHIGAN LAW
REVIEW, 537.
Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reason-
ing (1913) 23 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 16; (1917) 26 ibid. 710.
The Need of Remedial Legislation in the California Law of Trusts and
Perpetuities (1913) I CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW, 305.
A Vital School of Jurisprudence and Law (1914) Proceedings of
Association of American Law Schools.
The Conflict of Equity and Law (1917) 26 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 767.
Faulty Analysis in Easement and License Cases (1917) 27 YALE LAW
JOURNAL, 66.
At the time of his illness and death Hohfeld was planning the comple-
tion and publication in the immediate future of the analytical work
so well begun in the three articles which must be regarded as the most
important contributions which he made to the fundamentals of legal
theory, viz. the two upon Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied
in Judicial Reasoning, and the one upon The Relations Between Equity
and Law. These three essays contain in broad outline what are
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perhaps the most important portions of the contemplated treatise.
Buried away in the pages of the magazines in which they were pub-
lished they are, like so many other important discussions in the legal
periodicals, but little known even to the more intelligent and better
educated of the practicing lawyers and judges, or indeed of the law
teachers of the country. If the present number of the JOUJRNAL
succeeds in bringing these discussions to the attention of a larger
number of the legal profession it will have accomplished its purpose.
"Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reason-
ing"--the very title reveals the true character of Hohfeld's interest
in the analytical field. "As applied in judicial reasoning"-that is
the important thing; fundamental legal conceptions not in the abstract,
but used concretely in the solving of the practical problems which arise
in the every-day work of lawyer and judge.
Before we examine the main outlines of the structure which
Hohfeld had planned and started to build, let one thing be clearly
said. No one realized more clearly than did he that none of us can
claim to have been the originator of any very large portion of any
science, be it legal or physical. It is all that can be expected if each
one of us succeeds in adding a few stones, or even one, to the ever-
growing edifice which science is rearing. It follows that anything
which one writes must largely be made up of a re-statement of what
has already been said by others in another form. Each one of us
may congratulate himself if he has added something of value, even
if that consists only in so re-arranging the data which others have
accumulated as to throw new light upon the subject-a light which
will serve to illuminate the pathway of those who come after us and
so enable them to make still further progress.
In the first of the two essays upon Fundamental Legal Concep-
tions Hohfeld sets forth the eight fundamental conceptions in terms
of which he believed all legal problems could be stated. He arranges
them in the following scheme:
Jural Opposites right privilege power immunity
uno-right duty disability liability
Jural Correlatives right privilege power immunity
i duty no-right liability disability
One thing which at once impresses itself upon one who is familiar
with law, and especially with the work of writers upon jurisprudence
who preceded Hohfeld, is that the terms found in this scheme are
with one exception not new, but have always been more or less fre-
quently used. To be sure, they have not ordinarily been used with
precision of meaning as in the table we are considering; on the contrary,
they have been given one meaning by one person, another by another,
or indeed, different meanings by the same person upon different occa-
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sions. It is also true that nearly all the concepts which these terms
represent in Hohfeld's system ha-ve been recognized and discussed by
more than one writer upon jurisprudence.' A brief consideration
serves to show, however, that the concepts and terms which are new
are needed to logically complete the scheme and make of it a useful
tool in the analysis of problems. When so completed, these legal
concepts become the "lowest common denominators" in terms of
which all legal problems can be stated, and stated so as to bring out
with greater distinctness than would otherwise be possible the real
questions involved. Moreover, as previously suggested, the writers
who did recognize many of these concepts failed to make any real
use of them in other portions of their work.2
That the word right is often used broadly to cover legal relations
-in general has probably been at least vaguely realized by all thoughtful
students of law. Thus, to take a concrete example, nearly all of us
have probably noted at some time or other that the "right" (privilege)
of self-defense is a different kind of "right" from the "right" not
to be assaulted by another; but that legal thinking can never be truly
accurate unless we constantly discriminate carefully between these
different kinds of rights, few of us have sufficiently realized. We
constantly speak of the right to make a will; the right of a legis-
lative body to enact a given statute; of the right not to have one's
property taken without due process of law, etc. In these and innumer-
able other instances it turns out upon examination that the one word
"right" is being used to denote first one concept and then another,
often with resulting confusion of thought.
With the clear recognition of the fact that the same term is being
used to represent four distinct legal conceptions comes the convic-
tion that if we are to be sure of our logic we must adopt and con-
sistently use a terminology adequate to express the distinctions
involved. The great merit of the four terms selected by Hohfeld
for this purpose-right, privilege, power and immunity-is that they
are already familiar to lawyers and judges and are indeed at times used
with accuracy to express precisely the concepts for which he wished
always to use them.
Right in the narrow sense-as the correlative of duty-is too well
known to require extended discussion at this point. It signifies one's
affirmative claim against another, as distinguished from "privilege,"
one's freedom from the right or claim of another. Privilege is a
term of good repute in the law of defamation and in that relating to
'Terry, Leading Principles of Anglo-American Law, ch. VI, 84-138; Salmond,
Jurisprudence (4th ed.) ch. X, i79-i96.
'Terry seems to the present writer the only one who even glimpsed the
importance of these concepts in the actual analysis and settlement of legal prob-
lems.
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the duty of witnesses to testify. In defamation we say that under
certain circumstances defamatory matter is "privileged," that is,
that the person publishing the same has a privilege to do so. By this
statement we are not asserting that the person having the privilege has
an affirmative claim against another, i. e., that that other is under a
duty to refrain from publishing the defamatory matter, as we *are
when we use "right" in the strict sense, but just the opposite. The
assertion is merely that under the circumstances there is an absence
of duty on the part of the one publishing the defamatory matter to
refrain from doing so under the circumstances. So in reference to
the duty of a witness to testify: upon some occasions we say the
witness is privileged, i. e., that under the circumstances there is an
absence of duty to testify, as in the case of the privilege against self-
incrimination. 3 "Privilege" therefore denotes absence of duty, and
its correlative must denote absence of right. Unfortunately there is
no term in general use which can be used to express this correlative
of privilege, and the coining of a new term was necessary. The term
devised by Hohfeld was "no-right," obviously fashioned upon an
anal6gy to our common words nobody and nothing. The exact term
to be used is, of course, of far less importance than the recognition
of the concept for which a name is sought. The terms "privilege"
and "no-right," therefore, denote respectively absence of duty on
the part of the one having the privilege and absence of right on the
part of the one having the "no-right."'4
All lawyers are familiar with the word "power" as used in
reference to "powers of appointment." A person holding such a
"power" has the legal ability by doing certain acts to alter legal
relations, viz., to transfer the ownership of property from one person
to another. Now the lawyer's world is full of such legal "powers,"
and in Hohfeld's terminology any human being who can by his acts
produce changes in legal relations has a legal power or powers.
Whenever a power exists, there is at least one other human being
whose legal relations will be altered if the power is exercised. This
situation Hohfeld described by saying that the one whose legal rela-
tions will be altered if the power is exercised is under a "liability."
Care must be taken to guard against misapprehension. "Liability"
as commonly used is a vague term and usually suggests something
'Here the statement that there is a "right" against self-crimination does
indeed carry, in addition to the idea of privilege, that of a right stricto sensu, and
also when the general "right" in question is given by the constitution, of legal
immunity, with correlative lack of constitutional power, i. e. disability, on the
part of the legislative body to abolish the privilege and the right.
'Doubtless some will deny that these conceptions-privilege and no-right-are
significant as representing legal relations. See the brief discussion of this point
by the present writer in (i918) 28 YALE LAw JouRNAL, 391.
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disadvantageous or burdensome. Not so in Hohfeld's system, for a
"liability" may be a desirable thing. For example, one who owns a
chattel may "abandon" it. By doing so he confers upon each person
in the community a legal power to acquire ownership of the chattel by
taking possession of it with the requisite state of mind.
5 Before the
chattel is abandoned, therefore, every person other than the owner is
under a legal "liability" to have suddenly conferred upon him a new
legal power which previously he did not have. So also any person can
by offering to enter into a contract with another person confer upon the
latter-without his consent, be it noted-a power by "accepting" the
offer to bring into existence new legal relations.
6 It follows that every
person in-the community who is legally capable of contracting is under
a liability to have such a power conferred upon him at any moment.
Another use of the term "right," possibly less usual but by no
means unknown, is to denote that one person is not subject to the
power of another person to alter the legal relations of the person
said to have the "right." For example, often when we speak of the
"right" of a person not to be deprived of his liberty or property
without due process of law, the idea sought to be conveyed is of the
exemption of the person concerned from a legal power on the part
of the persons composing the government to alter his legal relations
in a certain way. In such cases the real concept is one of exemption
from legal power, i. e., "immunity." At times, indeed, the word
"immunity" is used in exactly this sense in constitutional law.a In
Hohfeld's system it is the generic term to describe any legal situa-
tion in which a given legal relation vested in one person can not be
changed by the acts of another person.
7  Correlatively, the one who
6 That is, with the intention of appropriating it If the possession were taken
merely with the intention of keeping it for its owner, the interest acquired
would be merely that of any other person lawfully in possession, with an added
power to acquire ownership by the formation of an intention to appropriate the
article in question. In either case the other members of the community would,
simultaneously with the assumption of possession by the finder, lose their powers
to acquire ownership of the article.
'For an application of the above analysis to the formation of contracts, see
Corbin, Offer and Acceptance, and Some of the Resulting Legal Relations (.917)
26 YALE LAw JouRNAL., i6g.
'a One has, to be sure, a right (in the strict sense) not to be deprived of his
physical liberty or tangible "property" except by due process of law, and doubt-
less this is what is frequently meant when it is said that one has the 'right" in
question. At other times, however, the idea meant to be conveyed is not this,
but rather, as stated in the text, legal exemption from power on the part of
the legislature of the state to alter one's legal relations in a certain way. In
such cases the word "right" really stands for immunity.
' One may, of course, with reference to any given legal relation or set of rela-
tions, have an immunity against one person and not against another, against
people generally and not against "everybody."
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lacks the power to alter the first person's legal relations is said to be
under a "disability," that is, he lacks the legal power to accomplish
the change in question. This concept of legal "immunity" is not
unimportant, as Salmond in his "Jurisprudence" seems to indicate
by placing it in a brief footnote. For example, the thing which dis-
tinguishes a "spendthrift trust" from ordinary trusts is not merely
the lack of power on the part of the cestui que trust to make a con-
veyance of his interest, but also the immunities of the cestui from
having his equitable interest divested without his consent in order to
satisfy the claims of creditors.8 Ordinary exemption laws, homestead
laws, etc., also furnish striking illustrations of immunities.9
A power, therefore, "bears the same general contrast to an immunity
that a right does to a privilege. A right is one's affirmative claim
against another, and a privilege is one's freedom from the right or
claim of another. Similarly, a power is one's affirmative 'control'
over a given legal relation as against another; whereas an immunity
is one's freedom from the legal power or 'control' of another as
regards some legal relation." 10
The conceptions for which the terms "liability" and "disability"
stand have been criticized by Dean Pound of the Harvard Law School
as being "quite without independent jural significance."" He also
regards the terms themselves as open to objection on the ground that
"each name is available and in use for other and important legal
conceptions." The latter point while important is after all a ques-
tion of phraseology. Upon the first point, it is difficult to follow
Dean Pound's argument. The eight concepts of Hohfeld's classifi-
cation are the means by which we describe generically the legal
relations of persons. Any given single relation necessarily involves
two persons. Correlatives in Hohfeld's scheme merely describe the
situation viewed first from the point of one person and then from
that of the other. Each concept must therefore, as a matter of logic,
have a correlative. If A has a legal "power," he must by definition
have the legal ability by his acts to alter some other person's legal
relations.2 If so, then-as Dean Pound himself recognizes later on
'Cf. the situation under the federal Homestead Exemption Law, discussed in
(IgIg) 28 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 283.
'Usually a person having an immunity is also vested with other legal relations
which accompany it, but this is true of legal relations generally; nearly every
situation upon analysis turns out to involve a more or less complex aggregate
of all the different kinds of legal relations. The vital point in many cases,
however, involves primarily the presence or absence of an immunity rather than
some other legal relation.
' Hohfeld, in the article in 23 YALE LAW JOURNAL.
' In his discussion of Legal Rights in (i916) 26 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF'
ETHics, 92, 97.
"His own also, or those of still another person, as where an agent makes a
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in the same discussion-that other person "is subject to have" his
legal relations "controlled (altered) by another." Certainly, call
it what you will, we have here a perfectly definite legal concept, the
correlative of "power." So of "disability": If A is legally exempt
from having one or more of his legal relations changed by B's acts,
the situation as seen from B's point of view is that B can not so alter
A's relations, i. e., B is under a legal "disability." Again the par-
ticular term may be open to criticism; the conception involved is as
clearly the correlative of "immunity" as "no-right" is the correlative
of "privilege"; nevertheless, Dean Pound seems to recognize the
"independent jural significance of the latter
13 while denying that of
the former.
Rights, privileges, powers, immunities-these four seem fairly to
constitute a comprehensive general classification of legal "rights" in
the generic sense. The four correlative terms-duty, no-right, lia-
bility and disability-likewise sufficiently classify the legal burdens
which correspond to the legal benefits.13a It is interesting in passing
to note that of the two writers who preceded Hohfeld, neither Terry
nor Salmond had completed the scheme. In Terry's Principles of
Anglo-American Law, rights stricto sensu appear as "correspondent
rights," privileges as "permissive rights," powers as "facultative
rights"; but immunities not at all. Moreover the correlatives are
not worked out. In Salmond's Jurisprudence privileges are called
"liberties"-a mere question of phraseology,--immunities are treated
as relatively unimportant, and liability is treated as the correlative of
both liberty (privilege) and power. This assignment of a single
correlative for two independent conceptions must result sooner or
later in confusion of thought, for if the distinction between privilege
and power be valid-as it clearly is-then the distinction between the
correlatives, no-right and liability, must be equally valid.
The credit for the logical completion of the scheme of classifica-
tion and the recognition of the importance of each element in it may
thus fairly be given to Hohfeld. It is believed also that his presenta-
contract for a principal; but in each case he cannot act so as to alter his own
or this other person's legal relations without altering at the same time the first
person's relations, since the concept involved is of the legal relation of one person
to another person. A lead-pencil must have two ends; so must a legal relation.
"Dean Pound does not even mention immunity, but that of course disappears
as a fundamental legal conception if we deny the jural significance of its cor-
relative, disability. Note that in dealing with the correlatives, we are looking
at the same situation from the point of view of first one and then the other
of the two persons involved, but that when dealing with the jural opposites we
are looking at two different situations from the point of view of the same person,
i. e. in one situation he has, for example, a right, in the other, "no-right."
"a "Burden" is here used loosely. A liability, as previously pointed out, may
be a beneficial thing.
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tion of it in the form of a table of "jural correlatives" and "jural
opposites" has done much to clarify and explain it. A still more
important thing, as has been suggested above, is that he demonstrated
how these fundamental legal concepts were of the utmost utility and
importance in bringing about a correct solution of concrete legal
problems. Here also credit to some extent must in all fairness be
given to Terry, as above indicated, but Hohfeld seems to the present
writer to be the first one who appreciated to the full the real sig-
nificance of the analysis. In the first of the articles upon Fundamental
Legal Conceptions he demonstrated its utility by many examples
from the law of contracts, torts, agency, property, etc., showing how
the courts are constantly confronted by the necessity of distinguish-
ing between the eight concepts and are all too often confused by the
lack of clear concepts and precise terminology. On the other hand,
so clear a thinker as Salmond has shown himself to be in his Juris-
prudence fails to make any substantial use of the analysis in his book
on Torts. Indeed, so far as the present writer has been able to dis-
cover, one might read his Torts through and never realize that any
such analysis as that found in the Jurisprudence had ever been made.
Yet the problems involved in such subjects as easements, privilege
in defamation, and other portions of the law of torts too numerous to
mention, require for their accurate solution cafeful discrimination
between these different concepts.
Even in the work on Jurisprudence itself Salmond completely fails
in certain chapters to show an appreciation of the meaning of these
fundamental conceptions. Consider, for example, the following pas-
sage from the chapter on "Ownership":
"Ownership, in its most comprehensive signification, denotes the rela-
tion between a person and any right that is vested in him. That which
a man owns is in all cases a right. When, as is often the case, we
speak of the ownership of a material object, this is merely a convenient
figure of speech. To own a piece of land means in truth to own a
particular kind of right in the land, namely the fee simple of it.' 14
From the point of view of one who understands the meaning of the
eight fundamental legal concepts, it would be difficult to pen a more
erroneous passage. To say that A owns a piece of land is really
to assert that he is vested by the law with a complex--exceedingly
complex, be it noted-aggregate of legal rights, privileges, powers
and immunities-all relating of course to the land in question. He
does not own the rights, etc., he has them ;14a because he has them,
" Salmond, Jurisprudence, 22o.
"4a When used with discrimination, the word own seems best used to denote the
legal consequences attached by law to certain operative facts. So used, it of
course connotes that these facts are true of the one said to own the article in
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he "owns" in very truth the material object concerned; there is no
"convenient figure of speech" about it. To say that A has the "fee
simple" of a piece of land is, therefore, to say not that he "owns a
particular kind of right in the land" but simply that he has a very
complex aggregate of rights, privileges, powers and immunities, avail-
ing against a large and indefinite number of people, all of which
rights, etc., naturally- have to do with the land in question.
The full significance and great practical utility of this conception
of "ownership" would require a volume for its demonstration. When
one has fully grasped it he begins to realize how superficial has been
the conventional treatment of many legal problems and to see how
little many commonly accepted arguments prove. He discovers, for
example, that "a right of way" is a complex aggregate of rights,
privileges, powers and immunities; is able to point out precisely which
one of these is involved in the case before him, and so to demonstrate
that decisions supposed to be in point really dealt with one of the
other kinds of "rights" (in the generic sense) and so are not applic-
able to the case under discussion. He soon comes to look upon this
newer analysis as an extraordinary aid to clearness of thought, as a
tool as valuable to a lawyer a's up-to-date instruments are to a surgeon.
In the second of the articles upon Fundamental Legal Conceptions
Hohfeld outlined in brief the remainder of the work as he planned it,
as follows:
"In the following pages it is proposed to begin the discussion of
certain important classifications which are applicable to each of the
eight individual jural conceptions represented in the above scheme.
Some of such overspreading classificatiopas consist of the following:
relations in personam ('paucital' relations), and relations in rem
('multital' relations) ; common (or general) relations and special (or
particular) relations; consensual relations and constructive relations;
primary relations and secondary relations; substantive relations and
adjective relations; perfect relations and imperfect relations; con-
current relations (i. e., relations concurrently legal and equitable) and
exclusive relations (i. e., relations exclusively equitable). As the bulk
of our statute and case law becomes greater and greater, these classi-
fications are constantly increasing in their practical importance: not
only because of their intrinsic value as mental tools for the compre-
hending and systematizing of our complex legal materials, but also
because of the fact that the opposing ideas and terms involved are
at the present time, more than ever before, constituting part of the
normal foundation of judicial reasoning and decision."1 5
question. If we confine own to this meaning, obviously we can not say that
one owns a right or other legal relation, for the latter is itself one of the legal
consequences denoted by the word ov. On the other hand, we commonly do
say that one has a right, a power, etc., and this usage does not seem undesirable
or likely to lead to any confusion, even though we also say one has a physical
object.
"(1917) 26 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 712.
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Of this comprehensive programme, only two parts were even par-
tially finished at the time of Hohfeld's untimely death, viz., that
devoted to a discussion of the classification of legal relations as in
rem ("multital") and in personam ("paucital") and that dealing with
the division of legal relations into those which are "concurrent" and
those which are "exclusive."
The division of "rights" into rights in rem and rights in personam
is a common one and is frequently thought to be of great importance.
It is, however, a matter upon which there is still much confusion even
on the part of those who are as a rule somewhat careful in their
choice of terms. As the present writer has elsewhere pointed out,
as able a thinker as the late Dean Ames at times used the phrase
"right in rem" in a sense different from that given to it in the usual
definitions, apparently without being conscious of the fact that he
was doing so.:" In the second of the articles upon Fundamental Legal
Conceptions Hohfeld sought by careful discussion and analysis to
dispel the existing confusion. In doing so he necessarily went over
mLch ground that is not new. The greatest merit of his discussion
seems to the present writer to consist in bringing out clearly the fact
that legal relations in rem ("multital" legal relations) differ from
those in personam ("paucital") merely in the fact that in the case
of the former there exists an indefinite number of legal relations, all
similar, whereas in the case of the latter the number of similar rela-
tions is always definitely limited. For this reason he suggested the
name "multital" for those which are in rem and "paucital" for those
in personam. These new terms have, to be sure, other things to
commend them: (i) they are free from all suggestion that legal
relations in rem relate necessarily to a physical res or thing or are
"rights against a thing" ;1 (2) they do not lead to the usual confusion
with reference to the relation of rights in rem and in personam to
actions and procedure in rem and in personam1
Even a slight consideration of the application of this portion of
Hohfeld's analysis to "ownership" of property will show the extent
of his contribution at this point. It is frequently said that an owner
of property has "a right in rem" as distinguished from "a mere right
in personam." As has already been pointed out above, what the owner
of property has is a very complex aggregate of rights, privileges,
powers and immunities. These legal relations prove on examination
to be chiefly in rem, i. e., "multital." Looking first at the owner's
", (i915) i5 COLUMBIA L. REV. 43.
11"A cestui que trust has an equitable right in rein against the land and not
merely a right in personaum against the holder of the legal title." Professor
Zechariah Chafee, Jr., in (1918) 31 HARv. L. Rlv. 11o4.
' See the present writer's discussion of this point in (1915) 15 COLUI iA L.
REv. 37-54.
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rights in the strict sense-these clearly include a large number that
are in rem. Note the plural form- "rights." As Hohfeld very
properly insisted, instead of having a single right in rem, the "owner"
of property has an indefinite number of such rights-as many, that is,
as there are persons under correlative duties to him.. A single right
is always a legal relation between a person who has the right and some
one other person who is under the correlative duty.1 9 Each single
right ought therefore to be called "a right in rem," or a "multital"
right. The "ownership" includes the whole group of rights in rem
or "multital" rights, as well as other groups of "multital" privileges,
"multital" powers, and "multital" immunities. 20
Familiarity with an adequate analysis of this kind reveals the hope-
less inadequacy of a question which has frequently been asked and
to which varying answers have been given, viz., whether a cestui
que trust has "a right in ren" or "a right in personam."2' The
so-called "equitable title" of the cestui proves upon analysis to con-
sist of an exceedingly complex aggregate of legal relations-rights,
privileges, powers, and immunities. These in turn upon examination
are found to include groups of rights in rem or "multital" rights-
differing perhaps in some details from common-law rights in rem
but nevertheless true rights in rem according to any accurate analysis.
So of the privileges, the powers, the immunities, of the "equitable
owner"-groups of "multital" relations are found.22 In other words,
the usual analysis to which we have been accustomed has treated a
very complex aggregate of legal relations as though it were a simple
thing, a unit. The result is no more enlightening than would it be
were a chemist to treat an extraordinarily complex chemical compound
as if it were an element.
This reference to the true nature of the legal relations vested in a
cestui que trust leads to consideration of the only other portion of
Hohfeld's contemplated treatise which was in any sense completed,
viz., his classification of legal relations as "concurrent" and "exclu-
sive." This is found in the MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW article entitled
The Relations between Equity and Law. This essay was written after
"In (1917) 26 YALE LAW JOuRNAL, 720, 742, Hohfeld seems to recognize that
there may be a single "joint right" or "joint duty.'; It is believed that as a
matter of substantive law this concept cannot be justified, although it is entirely
correct so far as procedural law is concerned.
'Illustrations will be found in the article under discussion.
="Is it [trust] jus in rein or jus in personam?" Walter G. Hart in (1912) 28
L. QUAr. REv. 290. Cf. also the discussion of The Nature of the Rights of
the Cestui Que Trust, by Professor Scott in (1917) 17 CoLumIA L. RE.v. 269,
and that on the same subject by Dean Stone in (19,7) 17 ibid. 467.
'There are also "paucital" relations of various kinds. In other words, an
"equitable interest" is an extremely complex aggregate of multital and paucital
rights, privileges, powers and immunities.
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a generation of law students in this country had been trained under
the influence of what might perhaps be called the "Langdell-Ames-
Maitland" school of thought as to the relation of equitr to common
law. Perhaps the plainest statement of the point of view of this
school is found in the following quotation from Maitland:
"Then as to substantive law the Judicature Act of 1873 took occasion
to make certain changes. In its 25th section it laid down certain rules
about the administration of insolvent estates, about the application
of statutes of limitation, about waste, about merger, about mortgages.
about the assignment of choses in action, and so forth, and it ended
with these words:
'Generally in all matters not hereinbefore particularly mentioned, in
which there is any conflict or variance between the rules of equity
and the rules of the common law with reference to the same matter,
the rules of equity shall prevail.'
"Now it may well seem to you that those are very important words,
for perhaps you may have fancied that at all manner of points there
was a conflict between the rules of equity and the rules of the com-
mon law, or at all events a variance. But the clause that I have just
read has been in force now for over thirty years, and if you will look
at any good commentary upon it you will find that it has done very
little-it has been practically without effect. You may indeed find
many cases in which some advocate, at a loss for other arguments,
has appealed to the words of this clause as a last hope; but you will
find very few cases indeed in which that appeal has been successful.
I shall speak of this more at large at another time, but it is important
that even at the very outset of our career we should form some notion
of the relation which existed between law and equity in the year x875.
And the first thing that we have to observe is that this relation was
not one of conflict. Equity had come not to destroy the law, but to
fulfil it. Every jot and every tittle of the law was to be obeyed, but
when all this had been done something might yet be needful, some-
thing that equity would require. Of course now and again there had
been conflicts: there was an open conflict, for example, when Coke
was for indicting a man who sued for an injunction. But such con-
flicts as this belong to old days, and for two centuries before the year
1875 the two systems had been working together harmoniously.
"Let me take an instance or two in which something that may for a
moment look like a conflict becomes no conflict at all when it is exam-
ined. Take the case of a trust. An examiner will sometimes be
told that whereas the common law said that the trustee was the owner
of the land, equity said that the cestui que trust was the owner. Well
here in all conscience there seems to be conflict enough. Think what
this would mean were it really true. There are two courts of
co-ordinate jurisdiction---one says that A is the owner, the other says
that B is the owner of Blackacre. That means civil war and utter
anarchy. Of course the statement is an extremely crude one, it is a
misleading and a dangerous statement-how misleading, how dan-
gerous, we shall see when we come to examine the nature of equitable
estates. Equity did not say that the cestui que trust was the owner of
the land, it said that the trustee was the owner of the land, but added
734 YALE LAW JOURNAL
that he was bound .to hold the land for the benefit of the cestid que
trust. There was no conflict here. Had there been a conflict here
the clause of the Judicature Act which I have lately read would have
abolished the whole law of trusts. Common law says that A is the
owner, equity says that B is the owner, but equity is to prevail, there-
fore B is the owner and A has no right or duty of any sort or kind
in or about the land. Of course the judicature Act has not acted in
this way; it has left the law of trusts just where it stood, because it
found no conflict, no variance even, between the rules of the common
law and the rules of equity."
2
To Hohfeld's logical and analytical mind this was not only not a
truthful description but about as complete a misdescription of the
true relations of equity and common law as could be devised. He
believed, moreover, that it was heresy in the sense that it departed
from the traditional view as found in classic writers upon equity,
such as Spence and others, and embodied in the English Judicature
Act in the well-known clause which is criticized by Maitland in the
passage quoted. As the latter himself seems to recognize in other
passages in his writings, 24 equity came, not to "fulfill every jot and
tittle" of the common law, but to reform those portions of it which
to the chancellor seemed unjust and out of date. Just how law can
at the same time be fulfilled and yet reformed is certainly difficult to
see.
A demonstration of the "conflict" between equity and law, i. e.,
of the fact that in many respects equity is a system of law paramount
to and repealing pro tanto the common-law rules upon the same point,
can be made fully clear only by one and to one who first of all under-
stands the eight fundamental legal conceptions. Such a one need not
use the precise terminology adopted by Hohfeld, but the concepts
themselves he must clearly have in mind. What Hohfeld here did,
therefore, was to take the orthodox and sound theory of equity as a
system which had effectually repealed pro tanto large portions of the
common law and by more scientific analysis conclusively demonstrate
its truth.
Rights in the general sense (legal relations in general) are commonly
divided into those which are "legal" and those which are "equitable,"
the usual meaning given to these terms being that the former are
recognized and sanctioned by courts of common law and the latter
by courts of equity. If we examine these so-called "legal" rights,
etc., more carefully than is usually done, we find that they clearly fall
into two classes, viz., (i) those which a court of equity will in one way
or another render of no avail; (2) those with the assertion of which
a court of equity will not interfere. Compare, for example, the
"Maitland, Equity, I6-I8.
" Especially in his essay upon The Unincorporate Body, 3 Collected Papers, 27i.
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so-called "legal (common-law) title" of a constructive trustee with
the "legal title" of an owner who is free from any trust. Clearly
the "legal ownership" of the former is largely illusory, while that
of the latter is quite the opposite. The truth of the situation appears
when, calling to our aid the eight fundamental conceptions, we exam-
ine the situation in detail. We then discover, for example, that while
the common-law court recognizes that the constructive trustee is privi-
leged to do certain things-e. g., destroy the property in question,
or sell it, etc.-in equity he is under a duty not to do so. In other
words, there is an "exclusively equitable" duty which conflicts with
and so nullifies each one of the "legal" (common-law) privileges
of the constructive trustee.
25
Careful consideration leads, therefore, to the conclusion that an
'exclusively common-law" relation, i. e., one which only the courts
of common law will recognize as valid, is as a matter of gentine
substantive law a legal nullity, for there will always be found some
other "exclusively equitable" relation which prevents its enforce-
ment. Thus, to take another concrete example, a tenant for life
without impeachment of waste has a common-law privilege to denude
the estate of ornamental and shade trees, but in equity is under a duty
not to do so. As privilege and duty are "jural opposites," the
"equity law" turns out to be exactly contrary to the "common-law
law." As equity has the last word, it follows that the "common-law
privilege" is purely illusory as a matter of genuine substantive law.26
The reader who wishes to pursue the analysis through a large number
of concrete examples will find ample material in the essay under
discussion. Limitations of space forbid more detailed treatment here.
All genuine substantive-law relations therefore fall into two classes:
(i) those recognized as valid by both courts of common law and
courts of equity; (2) those recognized as valid exclusively by equity.
The former we may call "concurrent," the latter, "exclusive." The
word "concurrent" is perhaps open to criticism. When Hohfeld
called a legal relation "concurrent" he did not mean to assert that
it will as such necessarily receive direct "enforcement" in equity as
well as at law. Equity may "concur" in recognizing the validity of a
given relation either actively or passively-actively, by giving equitable
remedies to vindicate it; passively,, by refusing to prevent its enforce-
'And so of the major portion of the other legal relations supposed to be
vested in the "constructive trustee." Some of the relations are, however, "con-
current," for example, the power to convey a "title" free from the trust to a
bona fide purchaser for value.
"'But not as a matter of procedural law. The "common-law courts" will
treat the "exclusively common-law" legal relations as though they were valid.
In a code state this means at most that the facts giving rise to the paramount
exclusive," i. e. exclusively equitable, relations must be pleaded affirmatively
as "equitable counterclaims" and not as mere "defences."
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ment in a court of common law. Consider, for example, the right of
an owner and possessor of land that others shall not trespass upon it.
So long as the common-law action for damages is adequate, equity
gives no direct aid; but, on the other hand, equity does not prevent
the recovery of damages at law for the trespass. Just as soon as
damages are inadequate, however, equitable remedies may be invoked.
A right of this kind may fairly be called "concurrent" and not
merely "legal" (common-law).
The matter may perhaps be put shortly as follows: what are
commonly called "legal" or common-law rights (and other legal
relations) really consist of two classes: (i) those which are in con-
flict with paramount exclusively equitable relations, and so are really
illusory; (2) those which do not so conflict and are therefore valid.
The latter are "concurrent."
Legal relations which are recognized as valid by equity but not
by common law are common enough in our system and are, of course,
valid. They may properly be called "exclusive," i. e., exclusively
equitable. It may here be noted that it has happened over and over
again that given legal relations were at first "exclusive" but that
after a time, because of changes in the common law, they became
"concurrent." This, for example, is true of the rights, etc., of the
assignee of an ordinary common-law chose in action.
27  While
originally the assignee's interest was "exclusive," he acquires to-day
not the "legal title" to the chose in action, but an aggregate of legal
relations which are "concurrent," just as were those of the assignor
before the assignment.
28
Be it noted this classification of really valid legal relations into
those which are "concurrent" and those which are "exclusive,"
applies equally to all the fundamental relations-rights, privileges,
powers, and immunities and their correlatives. To take a simple con-
crete example: At one period of our legal development the assignor
of a chose in action seems to have had an "exclusively common-law"
(and therefore, as a matter of substantive law, invalid) power to
release the debtor, even after notice from the assignee. In equity,
however, at the same period, such a release was not recognized as
valid, i. e., the assignee had, after notice to the debtor of the assign-
' See the present writer's discussion of The Alienability of Choses in Action
in (1916) 29 HA v. L. RFv. 816 and (1917) 3o HAxv. L. REv. 449, in which the
history of the assignee's "rights" is set forth.
'In his criticisms of my discussion of the "rights" of an assignee of a chose
in action, Professor Williston-partly, it is believed because of a failure to
appreciate fully the significance of the concept of "concurrent" legal relations-
has misapprehended and so unconsciously misstated my position. This is true
even in his final article. His discussions will be found in (1916) 3o HAgv. L.
Rav. 97 and (i918) 31 HAv. L. REv. 82.
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ment, an "exclusive" (exclusively equitable) immunity from having
the legal relations which the assignment vested in him divested by
acts of the assignor. The assignor was at the same time under an
"exclusive" duty not to execute such a "release," although he had
an "exclusively common-law" (but really invalid) privilege to do
so. At a later period these relations became "concurrent"; for
example, the "exclusive" immunity became "concurrent," so that
a release by the assignor after notice to the debtor of the assignment
was inoperative both at law and in equity.29
The present writer has been teaching equity to law students for
some eighteen years. During the past few years he has made greater
and greater use of Hohfeld's analysis of the relations of law and
equity, as well as of the more fundamental legal conceptions, and has
found it of the greatest utility in class-room discussion and state-
ment of the actual system of law under which we live. The terms
"concurrent" and "exclusive" may possibly be open to criticism.
It may, for example, be thought that "concurrent" savors too much
of activity and does not sufficiently suggest passive concurrence in
the validity of a given relation. Thus far, however, no better terms
have suggested themselves, or have been suggested by others, and as
it is difficult to use concepts without names, those suggested by Hohfeld
have been used with success. The important thing, after all, is to enable
the student and the lawyer to formulate general statements which
enable us to give an accurate picture of our legal system and to dis-
cuss our legal problems intelligently. In the doing of these things
the conceptions denoted respectively by the terms "concurrent" and
"exclusive" seem to the present writer an indispensable aid.
In the space at hand it is not possible even to summarize the con-
tents of the other essays enumerated in the list of Hohfeld's writings.
Of those which have not been discussed, the most important are the
articles upon the Individual Liability of Stockholders in the ninth
and tenth volumes of the COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW. In the first of
these will be found first of all an intelligible theory of what a cor-
poration really is-intelligible, that is, to those readers who will take
the trouble to think the matter through with Hohfeld in the terms
of the fundamental legal conceptions which he uses, but absolutely
unintelligible to those who will not. The current theory of a corpora-
tion as a "juristic person" disappears under the relentless logic of
Hohfeld's analysis, and we see how the recognition of the fact that
the only "persons" are human beings does not prevent us from ade-
quately describing all the legal phenomena which accompany so-called
"corporate existence." In the second of the two essays in question
will be found a valuable contribution to the theory of the conflict of
' For citation of cases, see the articles cited in note 27, supra.
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laws-a field in which Hohfeld had planned and hoped to write
extensively. Undoubtedly, too, his studies in the conflict of laws led
him to see more clearly than ever the necessity for a careful analysis
of fundamental conceptions, and the confusion which exists in that
field, especially as to the nature of law and its territorial operation,
furnished him with an abundance of material which stimulated a
naturally keen interest along analytical lines.
The address upon a Vital School of Jurisprudence and Law, deliv-
ered before the Association of American Law Schools in 1914, was
a summons to the law schools of the country to awake and do their
full duty in the way of training men, not merely for the business of
earning a living by "practicing law," but also for the larger duties
of the profession, so that they may play their part as judges, as legis-
lators, as members of administrative commissions, and finally as citi-
zens, in so shaping and adjusting our law that it will be a living, vital
thing, growing with society and adjusting itself to the mores of
the times. The programme thus outlined he lived to see adopted
substantially as that of the school with which he was connected but,
alas! he was not spared to see it carried out in any large measure.
That it may become the ideal of every university law school worthy of
the name, is devoutly to be wished. Granted that it is an ideal-a
"counsel of perfection," as the dean of one large law school was
heard to remark upon the occasion of its delivery-is that a reason
why we of the law schools should not come as near to reaching it as
we can? If to-day it is still a substance of things hoped for rather
than of things attained, shall we not labor the harder, that in the days
to come achievement may not fall so far short of aspiration?
"Hohfeld is an idealist," "a theorist"-these and similar remarks
the present writer has heard all too often from the lips of supposedly
"practical" men. Granted; but after all ideals are what move the
world; and no one recognized more clearly than did Hohfeld that
"theory" which will not work in practice is not sound theory. "It is
theoretically correct but will not work in practice" is a common but
erroneous statement. If a theory is "theoretically correct" it will
work; if it will not work, it is "theoretically incorrect!' Upon these
propositions Hohfeld's work was based; by these he would have it
tested. "Theory," to which he devoted his life, was to him a means
to an end-the solution of legal problems and the development of our
law so as to meet the human needs which are the sole reasons for its
existence. In the opinion of the present writer, no more "practical"
legal work was ever done than which is found in the pages of
Hohfeld's writings, and it is as such that the attempt has here been
made to outline the more fundamental portions of it, in the hope that
it may thus be brought to the attention of a wider circle of readers.
